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STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND DOUGLAS
FAIRBANKS ON 2 DECEMBER 1957 AT 1215 HOURS

F- "... speaking up at Oxford next week end. He said, 'I respect George ... and I know him, I have great respect for him. It's terribly difficult to speak with two different views from the same platform at Oxford University.'

D- "George--did you see George?"

F- "Yes."

D- "I don't know quite what George is driving at, you know. I mean, what does all this mean. There was quite a--."

F- "I saw--."

D- "To-do here in the, I think it was in the Times."

F- "Yes, I saw the ..., it was in the Times."

D- "No, it was in the Post, I guess."

F- "There is one in the Times in the inside."

D- "In the Times, too, yes."

F- "Well, he's spelled out his reasons. Like every view, there are two sides to it. I think that there is something to be said for considering a phase of what he proposes. After all, certainly very few people know the subject better than what he does."

D- "Yes."

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- F- "And from all I can gather from people who know the situation better than I do and I've been around the UN a great deal the last few days and, as you know, traveling around. It seems to me the Russians will fight only with a threat to their satellites. That's the only thing they'll fight over; in other words, I think they--I don't think they'll fight over the Middle East or I don't think they'll ever have any intention, myself--."
- D- "They don't want to fight now if they can possibly avoid it."
- F- "Yes."
- D- "I don't know, some years hence it may be different but--."
- F- "Some years hence, but policy ^{wise} words I think it serves their purpose to deny us the Middle East or compromise us or embarrass the Middle East if they can--."
- D- "Sure."
- F- "But there is no great urgency on acquiring it for themselves in the same way because it's not a--."
- D- "They'd like to deny the oil to us; they think that would weaken Europe a great deal, as it would. It wouldn't affect the United States so much except that we would have to share our oil with Europe and we haven't got enough to go around."

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25X1 F- "What did you think of that suggestion--I'll just remind you because with so many papers, you may not remember where it's from or anything else that's sent through, dropped in, that--instead of trying to reconcile our differences on the basic policies but to start trimming them down in little places and do it behind the scenes first rather than a big open before-the-world thing. The first thing would be to call off the dogs in counter-propaganda subversion in the Middle East and see how it works for a year's trial; if we would stop attacking their vital interests or pull in a bit that they would venture to do the same and give it a year's trial, if it didn't work, well, we'd go back to where we started. That was--."

D- "Oh, I think there is a good deal in that. We're not--they're much better equipped, as a matter of fact, with their radio position in the Middle East than we. Radio Cairo on the Arab side is by far the most potent voice there is in the area and, after all, the great percentage of the educated Arabs are Egyptians. It just happens to be the case; I mean, you can't change that overnight. Therefore, they are able to put on more effective programs, by and large, than we are. I suppose in the radio field

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they have an advantage over us. They have from time to time, they are very funny about that, they'll have a most ... campaign and then all of a sudden they will stop it. Then, you think, well, this is fine and then in about two weeks, they'll start it again; you don't quite know why they deny them one or the other."

F- "Well, they have hinted through--not Malik himself--but through his intermediary that they would like to have us consider a behind-the-scenes, off-the-record, agreement that they'll lay off if we'll lay off and give it a year's trial and see how it works and take the pressure off these areas because they say that--."

D- "What does that mean? That we would lay off--you're talking about, say, about the Middle East now or are you talking about broader areas or just about the Middle East?"

F- "Well, they didn't specify. What they did specify was that 'we'll lay off the Middle East if you lay off our vital interest.' Now, they didn't specify whether 'our vital interest' was the Middle East or the satellite countries."

D- "If they mean that we'd have to stop all broadcasting of all kinds to the satellites, that would be pretty tough."

F- "I don't think it was spelled out--I don't think they would expect us to do that because that would become too overt."

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D- "Yes."

F- "I think what they mean is take the sting out of it and put forward purely cultural and that sort of thing, and then they would stop trying to undermine us."

D- "As I understand it, our broadcast now to Poland is pretty much of that nature."

F- "I talked to the Polish Ambassador the other night to the UN who is a very cultivated man and fellow who is a Catholic and he allowed us how that our program is very potent in Poland."

D- "Potent."

F- "Yes, he said he was--."

D- "Yes, I think it has been, but I think it's been quite careful; I mean, there has been no incitement to revolt and I think we've stopped a good deal of the old kind of attacks on Communism and so forth and so on, which just alone I don't think are very useful. I think you've got to--and it would be hard to stop--if you did that, then the people in the satellite countries would think, 'Well, they've given us up. They've written us off for the time being, they've reached a deal with the Soviet Union.' The Middle East is another situation; I think that if we could quiet down the Middle East from every angle, it would be a very good thing."

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F- "They will want their quid pro quo, that's the trouble with that."

D- "Yes. I don't think that would be an equal quid pro quo really, just to have the Middle East against the whole satellite area. We're not anxious to incite the satellites to revolt, but we want to keep the sort of hope for freedom alive there and the radio is one of the few ways of doing it."

F- "I've got two difficult speeches to make in Chicago in about two weeks time for the Council on Foreign Relations where they're having a tremendous turn-up. Adlai is one of the directors of it--."

D- "Oh, yes, I know that, I know that."

F- "And then another one that same night to a smaller group that is off-the-record. My problem is to say things that are interesting that is not--go counter to policy and yet say a few things which may be private ideas and separate the two of them somehow."

D- "Well, I'm sure you can do it, it's not too easy."

F- "Oh, I'm sweating over it very hard."

D- "The Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago is an eminent body. I've known it for twenty-odd years. Who runs it now?"

F- "Oh, I've got to--."

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- D- "Quincy Wright used to, Mr. and Mrs. Quincy Wright used to, I don't know who runs it but he used to--."
- F- "I've got all the names in my briefcase, I've forgotten their names. The tenor of the thing will be more or less of a report; I was asked to make a report on the attitude of our allies and supporters and of the neutral or uncommitted countries towards us and why has it changed and try and analyze and report on why has the confidence in us lessened and what are the various views on how it can be re-established and as former. That is the gist--."
- D- "Of course, it differs a good deal from country to country. Our relations with Germany have kept on and with most of the members of NATO; there have been ups and downs with France because of the Algerian question and Tunisia and things of that sort. Our relations today with India, I think, are better than they were a couple of years ago."
- F- "But there is a sort of lessening of that sort of blind, almost idolagous, following of everything that we say must ... be right--."
- D- "Oh, yes, I don't know, do you think that ever really existed?"
- F- "At one time, we were the never-never land of hope and glory--."

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D- "Yes, well, that was unrealistic, you know."

F- "And now we've become human like the rest of them and only just a little more powerful and richer than the rest but just as human and just as capable of making mistakes. There is, I think, a certain lethargy and lack of enthusiasm growing."

D- "Well, it depends a little bit on, I wouldn't quite go-- take Italy, for example. Our relations with Italy are better than they were two years ago on the whole, I think. Some of the countries it is not the case; we've lost in certain areas of the Middle East, no doubt. We've lost in Egypt and in Syria."

F- "One of the Israelis was telling me the other night the suggestion from the Israel standpoint, but he knows Arab countries well that he's been there and speaks perfect Arabic and he dines with them, he's friendly with them behind the scenes, he castigates them in the UN but behind the scenes, they dine together and are friends. The suggestion that from the whole Middle East psychology that if we were to continue to establish and even more forcefully establish our identification with their eventual welfare, not to take too seriously their sense of nationalism because nationalism is purely a word without a plan,

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it hasn't got a plan like in the more developed countries. It's a spark put out by leaders who play musical chairs with each other--but that we would withdraw our physical presence. We will say 'now, that opens us up to military insecurity.' He was carrying on the argument that if we withdrew to African bases, the security is just the same because we could come in there just as quickly as the Russians who were withdrawn, but that our physical presence, although it has some advantages, has more disadvantages from the standpoint of propaganda against us."

D- "I wonder what he means by physical presence? Where, for example? The only base we have, and that's not very much of a base, is Dhahran. That doesn't worry anybody very much because it way out there in the desert and has no effect on population, I mean--."

F- "Whether he meant the moving in of the fleets and the show of physical power on their shores or not, I would ^{venture} to say--I may be putting words into his mouth."

D- "Yes, that was only done on one occasion when things looked pretty ... in Jordan--."

F- "There's the threat of it, the sense that we're prepared to interfere there rather than--."

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- D- "We're the ones that haven't, the British and French interfered in Egypt--."
- F- "Well, he has the same thing to say about them as well."
- D- "And we've had no troops--we've put no troops in anywhere. We've sent very few arms, we sent some arms to Jordan but there isn't much American physical power presence right in the Middle East. As I say, we've got an air base in Dhahran but I've never heard anybody worry about that, it's way out there, it doesn't effect the people at all. We have no other air bases except for Turkey, of course."
- F- "No, he was excluding Turkey in his talk--."
- D- "Yes."
- F- "He meant the Arab and Israel thing if we--whether he meant that more negotiations could be done between them by indirection rather than direction by ...--."
- D- "We're trying to leave now, on this Israeli-Egyptian thing, more and more to the countries themselves; I mean, you've got Saudi Arabia and Iraq and Jordan and Lebanon all feel more or less alike about it. We're still playing around with Egypt; that hasn't been written off finally, you know, and no reason to write it off. The Syrian thing is quieter than it was because they're having their own troubles internally and there are two groups in Syria that are beginning to contend inside Syria so that--."

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- F- "Of course, if the present group in Syria get thrown out, the Russians can say that we'll say that we've done it, of course. I suppose that's the rebuttal of that whether--."
- D- "Well, you'd have to throw out about three groups if you throw them out now; I mean, there are two or three different--."
- F- "Did you read Sulzberger this morning in the Times?"
- D- "Yes, I'm kind of irritated at it. You know, these columnists--I would just like to give them about five minutes responsibility. There is not a concrete suggestion in there. I know Cy very well, but I really thought that was a pretty irritating sort of thing. Do you ever see them come out with a plan? They don't ^{dare} come out with a plan."
- F- "We used to say in my business that a critic is like a eunuch he can tell other people how to do it but can't do it himself."
- D- "Yes, I read Cy. Writing like Jehovah from a mountain top and there were quite a number of errors in the thing to boot, but still--. Cy is a good fellow but they think they've got a pontificate and if they enjoy it, well and good. I've forgotten it myself, I remember reading it."

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- F- "Well, I think the gist of it was a kind of inconsistency in various places that we haven't--."
- D- "Should foreign policy be consistent necessarily?"
- F- "I think--."
- D- "You can't--."
- F- "I think that definitely there shouldn't be because circumstances change the art of ...--."
- D- "... art or science and so forth. You have to ..."
- F- "He starts talking that it should be changed but at the same time, ..."
- D- "Yes, ... Well, the question of unification of Germany is largely in the hands of the Germans and the Germans don't want to unify on the present basis. You can't a majority of the Germans, and they've voted again and again, these people like (Walter Lippman), a great friend of mine, they want an entirely new German policy. How are you going to get a new German policy? The German people don't want it."
- F- "But are they voting at the moment? I go to Germany and when I was there--I've been twice in Germany since I've seen you, I think, about two or three weeks ago. I don't know whether they are, at the moment, voting on the basis of East-West German policy or voting for staying on the right side for this moment."

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- D- "Well, I don't know, I don't know. How can you tell, how can you tell. Cyrus--'.....'--we were supposed to have settled both Cyprus and Algeria."
- F- "Well, that's pretty silly."
- D- "Oh, well, you have to live with them."
- F- "But the Germans, it seems to me, are so terrified of war, more terrified than almost anybody, that with a little push or a little more security in their own internal economy, a little more independence of movement, they might seriously threaten to withdraw either from NATO or neutralize their position in order: (a) to be kept out of trouble; and (b), to settle the Eastern Germany thing. I talked to a great many different kinds of people who somehow or other always bring it up in a conversation. If they are against that idea, they will still acknowledge that it exists."
- D- "Well, I think that if you want to sell out to Russia, there are a great many things you can do and if all of Europe wants to become neutralized, which I think is a sell-out to Russia, it's just what Russia wants--."
- F- "I think so, too, of course it is."
- D- "That's their choice. Europe and the United States together is a great deal stronger than Russia and I think we can

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maintain that position. I think we're getting panicky. There is no reason in the world why we can't maintain that position and why Europe should say, 'All right, now, we'll be neutralized'--which means they're at the mercy of anything that Russia wants to do."

F- "Somehow or other--."

D- "We're not going to go to the support of a neutralized Europe."

F- "Naturally not."

D- "You can't--."

F- "But somehow or other--they've got an idea which somehow or other we must counter, is that the basic row is between us and the Russians and that they are not really basically involved in it and what they must do is to--now, that is not yet a majority opinion but it exists--."

D- "Yes, I think that's got to be countered in a way because--."

F- "Somehow or other we failed to identify ourselves with them. They feel that we have identified them with us. You see what I mean?"

D- "Yes, I think there is a good deal in that and I think maybe this NATO meeting ought to address itself to that."

F- "I'm trying to spell that idea out in my speech but I haven't yet found the words of saying it."

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- D- "Yes, I think that that's a---."
- F- "Simply and directly but I think that that is one of the--."
- D- "It's very important because if they don't want this, if they don't want to maintain their own individual strength-- but look at France, going into atomic weapons now--they've got the choice and if they reach that decision, that is their decision and there is nothing for us to say about it. I don't think the majority of the Europeans have reached that decision. They know the Russians, they know what the Russians would do if they became neutralized. What power would they have? What power of decision? Everytime anything happened, Moscow would say, 'Well, we'll turn on our guided missiles.' Well, if Europe can say, 'All right, you turn on your guided missiles, we'll turn on ours,' nothing happens. If the Russians just say, 'We'll turn on our guided missiles,' and they have no answer, but hope that we're going to come then and fight their battle, I don't know. I don't think the majority of them yet want that."
- F- "No, I don't think the majority do. All I'm saying is that I have a feeling and impression which gains all the time that that mood is growing rather than lessening."

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It's still a minority mood but even the majority who are against it acknowledge its existence, fear it, and also, when feeling in a argumentative mood, will put in an occasional word here and there supporting it."

- D- "Well, now, you take this last election in Germany where the issue was up and where Adenauer, whom I know quite well, and ~~(Carlo Schmid)~~ and others, they had that program--that was really their program in many ways and they made a miserable show of it. They had no real, it was no real campaign; it wasn't a battle, it was a rout--."
- F- "But I don't think you--."
- D- "Because, by and large, when you analyze the thing, it doesn't make sense."
- D- "Yes, but I don't think the German elections were decided on that issue; I think they were decided on economic and other issues. That was one of them which I think they--."
- D- "Well, I don't know--there weren't any. What were the great economic issues that were up? Of course, they had a measure of prosperity, it's always easier, and they had quite a forceful candidate even though he was pretty old. I thought that was going to militate against him, it didn't seem to. You go back--read the history of Europe of over a century ago and you will find that times people took the same attitude with regard to Russia as they are doing now."

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- F- "Yes, exactly, exactly. And immediately following the Napoleonic wars as well."
- D- "Yes. Of course, Europe cut itself all up, thereby, laid itself open to Russia in two great wars."
- F- "Well, I don't think that what we've done--."
- D- "But you can't over estimate the Russians greatly, you know, you can't over estimate greatly."
- F- "No."
- D- "Where they have put their minds to it where they have gone into the guided missile thing, they've done extremely well. But they still have a country where the standard of living is deplorably low and they've been able to do nothing about that yet because they've spent so much of their progress on military. There is no indication that the Soviet are prepared to cut down their military establishment; they've dropped some of their ground forces off, they wanted an excuse to do that anyway and have done it voluntarily. Salzberger had the feeling of we've kind of lost the battle to the Russians and that isn't the case, you know."
- F- "In the same way as we've evolved basically a bipartisan attitude to foreign affairs we vary, between the parties on the method of application, but still we know what we're for and what we're against internally--if we can achieve

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that same thing as between the nations who are on our side in that sense of participation, let us assume that you are right insofar as the German question is concerned, how can eliminate the fact that an opposition will feel differently so that--in other words, to so persuade--."

D- "Well, you can't eliminate that, you can't do that, there is always going to be differing views."

F- "Well, except, let's say, when during the Hitler threat which back in Paris it was less but which in its time was great. There was unanimity on the part of--that was not an issue between parties, everybody was against what they recognized as a major threat."

D- "Yes."

F- "And they all felt in the same thing together. Now, the parties in power in countries allied to us sympathize with us, but there are sizable minorities and groups within those countries who, maybe not be against us, but they are not for us either; they sort of just leave us alone--a real feeling that the row is between us and the Russians and that they are not really involved. It doesn't help anything to say that it's not true, but the point is that we haven't convinced them that it's not true yet. Somehow or other, we have not persuaded them that we've identified themselves with us."

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- D- "Yes. Of course, at the same time, Europe is terrified that we'll run off and make a deal with the Russians behind their backs."
- F- "Of course they are, sure."
- D- "And any suggestion of bilateral discussions is anathema. You'd think they'd say, 'Well, try to make a deal with the Russians, that will be fine.' On the contrary, and I think that goes to the opposition as well in most countries. Take on this disarmament thing, the Russians are very anxious naturally to talk with us. They say, 'You are the real problem, let's get down together.' Well, if we started that, there would be all hell to pay."
- F- "I don't think disarmament will get anywhere until the reasons for disarmament are reduced."
- D- "That's always been the case, I worked on disarmament in the 20s and the 30s. There hasn't been any real advance; Harold Stassen made an awful good attempt."
- F- "Well, people arm as a result of fear. The point is to eliminate or reduce the fear and then a disarmament comes automatically whether there is a--."
- D- "Here we are now with the Soviet menace in the guided missile field. Well, we've got to spend several billion more on

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guided missiles. We've had the lead in the nuclear field and we still have it, but they're getting ahead of us in the guided missile field apparently."

F- "Oh, I know what (Kennan's) point was that if we, on the NATO, with nuclear weapons, it will make it impossible for the Russians to contemplate withdrawing from the satellites because they won't entrust their satellites with nuclear weapons; therefore, they will have to remain there in force until we do--that's the gist of the thing."

D- "Yes."

F- "Well, is there any--?"

D- "Well, the other countries aren't quite satellites, they are going to look as though they are going to have them anyway. The British have them now and they have means of delivery by bombers. The French probably will have them, they ought not afford it probably but they probably will have them anyway; and, if the French have them, the Germans will have them. So, are you going to give them no adequate means of delivery, I mean, let them have the weapons but not have the means of delivery? ^{If} /They don't want these things, goodness knows, we're not going to force them on them."

F- "No."

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D- "But the clamor on the part of the governments is to get them and get them as soon as possible because then they think they will have an answer to the Russians. If the Russians threaten them with that they'll say, 'All right, you do that and we'll do it, too.' I think in a way maybe the salvation is that you will have this potential on both sides which will be so staggering that neither side could possibly win a war; that the damage that could be inflicted--and I think that's getting more and more so with the guided missile. And we've got to arrange to have these guided missiles scattered around so there couldn't be--and I think that would be perfectly feasible. We could have enough guided missile bases, it would be utterly impossible to knock them out all in half an hour or something of that kind. Then, your retaliatory force can be so great that the other fellow just can't risk it. If the Europeans go along with that, then you'll have a sense of great advantage over the Russians because you'll have a great network there and we'll be much nearer to them than they are to us. Not nearer to Europe, Europe would be just as near to them as they are to Europe but we'll have that advantage for the benefit of all. I don't think it is any time to adopt neutralism as an answer."

- F- "Certainly not, but the point is how are we going to counteract it, that's my argument. It's no time but it is growing partly out of fear, partly out of this thing in the dark, partly out of ignorance--."
- D- "Well, is it growing? Now, I wonder whether ... as it was two or three years ago."
- F- "Well, I certainly would hesitate to--."
- D- "You're over there and you see it."
- F- "Well, I'd certainly hesitate to debate anything in this department where certainly more knowledge comes in than anything I--."
- D- "Oh, no, no, it's interesting. It may be, I'd like--."
- F- "I can only report an impression gained rather than--can I borrow a match from you?"
- D- "Oh, excuse me, are there any matches in there? Some of them have none."
- F- "Yes, yes."
- D- "That is one?"
- F- "That is one that has some."
- D- "Some--one isn't some. Let's take a complete one. There is no doubt, you've got a problem in England that it is very possible, I suppose you would say it is probable, that if there were elections, the Labor Party would come

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think he would like to get--be more responsible. I think there is, on the part of a lot of people throughout, even responsible people who publicly are on our side and privately another way. Their own pride, national pride, steps in the way and that they are becoming stooges of ours somehow or other; again, coming back to that somehow or other, where I don't really know, is that we have failed to convince them that we are identified with their problems rather than we are making them--the US has got to be protected ... UN--."

D- "Yes, I think you're very right on that. It ought not to be portrayed as a struggle between the United States and Russia because if we wanted to make a compromise at the expense of the rest of the world, we probably could make a fairly good compromise. I don't think it would last or be good for any length of time, but we have no intention of doing anything of that sort."

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- F- "Well, subordinate partners know they are subordinate partners and, unhappily, some way or other, they can quote chapter and verse on how they are sometimes made to feel they are subordinate and they say, 'We know it ourselves, we don't have to be reminded.'"
- D- "I know it. That's very bad. I've always had the idea that Europe would become a kind of an equal third force. Europe--Free Europe is a country of two hundred million people, more people than we have in the United States, and by and large, its level of intelligence and competence and so for and so on are equal. They haven't got quite the raw resources but still, with Africa and if they handle Africa right, they could have all that, too. So, there isn't any reason why, theoretically, you couldn't build up a Europe, plus such resources in Africa, as an equal third force in this picture which would be a marvelous thing. Because, by and large, it would be on our side, but not be on our side from the point of view of hanging on to our coattails. We'd have an independent view of things. That, we could live with, you know, and that would be fine and then we'd have--because vis-a-vis the Russians, we'd always really stand together."
- F- "Yes. If we can somehow get that thought through, which I think we are trying to do but somehow or other, it comes out wrong on the other end."

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D- "Yes, I think you're right because I think, so far, we have to deal with each one individually and then it becomes a question of their individual problems. In France it's Algeria, it's Tunis, it's so forth and these problems-- but even if we don't have the relationships with MacMallin and with Selwyn Lloyd and the present British Government, I think it would be very good--."

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F- "Very good indeed."



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D- "Yes. I know him well from his time over here. Tell me, how long are you going to be over here? What are your plans?"

F- "Well, I'm just down in Washington today to see you and the Navy this afternoon, Lewis Strauss, and I go back to New York and I'll be there until the 21st."

D- "By the way, I've mentioned to Lewis that you and I were in touch--."

F- "Oh, fine."

D- "And that I'd seen you on this trip and so forth and so on."

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D- "I think you'll find no trouble there."

F- "How do you remember all those little things? How do you detatch that which you know everybody knows from the papers and that which you know that nobody else knows? Isn't that a constant problem?"

D- "Well, it is but, I don't know, it's just something that--."

F- "I remember FDR used to be the most insecure fellow in the work because he could never separate what he knew and what everybody else knew."

D- "Of course, my difficulty is that you go out to dinner-- and it's terribly difficult to tell what you've read in the newspapers and what you've read in the most secret telegrams. You read a lot in the Times and the Tribune and half a dozen papers--."

F- "That's where FDR used to drop bricks all the time. Mountbatten used to do it, too."

D- "I know, that's the hard thing."

F- "He used to talk about operation code names right out loud in front of everybody. Everybody was just shivering, you weren't supposed to even breathe the name of it, of the operation, and he'd drop and catch himself. It seems often the higher you are, the more insecure you are."

D- "It's difficult."

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D- "This is out in Chicago?"

F- "In Chicago."

D- "When do you do that?"

F- "On the 17th."

D- "17th of December."

F- "Yes."

D- "I will."

F- "I've got two speeches to make: one at lunch, the big one; and then an off-the-record one at night. Any trial balloons that you can wash your hands of later on and can say, 'I don't know anything about it,' I'd be very glad to weave it in because it generally follows the policy."

D- "I was going to get you to talk to--."

F- "And if you get any other--."

D- "I hope to get to New York on--I'm going to be up there for a bit, let's see, a week from today I'm going to be in New York, I hope to be. I don't get up there much, I wish I could."

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- F- "Will you be up there just for one day or--?"
- D- "I'm going to get off Sunday at noon and I've got to stay over for dinner Monday night, that's about all."
- F- "Oh, I'll be down in Georgia, I don't get back until Tuesday."
- D- "...?"
- F- "No, I'm director of Scripto Ballpoint Pen--."
- D- "Oh, really?"
- F- "And I have to earn my keep as director from time to time and raise the stock back and show up at an occasional board meeting."
- D- "Well, that was an amusing trip we had, wasn't it? It was great fun, I enjoyed it--."
- F- "Great fun, I saw--."
- D- "To meet you both and get to know you, it was really great fun. Stavros was down here the other day."
- F- "He's in New York now. I'm going to have dinner with him tomorrow."
- D- "He's in New York and Janie is there and they're going to open their--I'm afraid I'm going to miss their art show."
- F- "I think it's tomorrow or the next day I'm supposed to go, I don't know whether I can or not."

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D- "I'd like to see it. I, unfortunately, have got to go out to lunch. I had a lunch--I wanted you for lunch but I had this lunch before I--."

F- "Well, you're awfully kind to have given me so much time and forgive me for being--."

D- "Now, don't talk that way. I wonder if General Cabell is in. Do you know General Cabell?"

F- "May I call Sherman Adams? He asked me to call when I--."

D- "Sherman is in Europe."

F- "Is he?"

D- "He's in your home town, I think. He's in London."

F- "He sent a cable and said call me when you get in town."

D- "Well, I don't think Sherman can possibly be back--."

F- "Well, this was about two weeks ago when I knew that I was coming down here when he said that. Sherman Adams."

D- "Oh, Sherman Adams? Oh, excuse me, I thought you said Sherman Kent."

F- "No, Sherman Adams."

D- "Do you want to call him?"

F- "Well, his secretary. He just said to call when I leave you. He's a great fellow."

D- "Are you lunching with him?"

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F- "No, he just told me to call when I leave you just to see what my plans were. I'll talk to his secretary. Thank you very much."

D- "I can give you a glass of milk. That's all I'm going to take."

F- "No, that's fine, I've got a luncheon at the Metropolitan Club. I'm going over now and see ..."

D- "An old friend of mine. I've been a member since--for 35 years now."

F- "No. You know who put me up was Bill (Castle). Do you remember him?"

D- "Oh, do I--oh, Bill is around, you know. He's alive and kicking."

F- "Is he?"

D- "Oh, yes, Bill is a great fellow."

F- "Is his wife still alive, do you know?"

D- "Yes, Margaret is still alive and going strong."

F- "She was very ill a couple of years ago."

D- "She is a great deal thinner than she used to be; of course, she could get thinner, you know."

F- "Yes, she could."

D- "Well, she is. She doesn't look at all well but she's going strong. Have you transportation?"

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F- "I have outside."

D- "You have."

F- "Yes, thanks very much, yes. I have a friend who has been acting as chauffeur. Allen, it was grand to see you and let me know if there is anything between now and the 17th and I'll--."

D- "I will. I have your address in New York?"

F- "Yes, and anything else--when I go back over to the other side, I'll probably turn around and come back here in the end of January or February."

D- "Oh, you will? Well, it was very interesting to get your views. There is a lot in--I understand what you say."

F- "I'll send you a copy of the various speeches--."

D- "I don't feel as discouraged as some people do, you know. There are a lot of problems but they've got a lot of problems, too, and to think what Mr. Khrushchev has on his mind--it's always well to think of that, you know. You might put a little of that in your speech. He's got to re-organize the industry of his country, he's got to try to run now--this socialized industry, when it gets as big as it is getting to be, it's very very hard to manage. When it's small and growing and growing ahead, but when

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your problems begin and you get short of personnel here and laborers there and managers here and so forth and so on and get them all scrambled around and you've got agriculture on your hands and if you have a bad crop, you know, you've just had it."

F- "Remember we talked once about what is the origin of policy, how is that done?"

D- "Yes."

F- "So, I've sort of being snooping around for opinions on that and I don't presume or suppose that it's anything you--and it still doesn't answer the question, but all the answers came up the same that I got from those who should know--."

D- "Yes."

F- "Which is that--it's surprising how much is that to just ordinary human discussion around a group of sixteen, that they will comment and idea will be put forth and sometimes on the spur of the moment and then sent down to be studied and then be sent back up again."

D- "Yes."

F- "But I don't suppose that's a particularly--."

D- "They have a pretty good policy apparatus there in the Soviet, there's no question about that. That works pretty well."

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